UIC Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 2

Spring 1972

The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Pointing the Way to
Needed Changes in Illinois, 5 J. Marshall J. of Prac. & Proc. 242
(1972)
Howard T. Brinton

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Howard T. Brinton, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Pointing the Way to Needed Changes in
Illinois, 5 J. Marshall J. of Prac. & Proc. 242 (1972)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: POINTING THE WAY TO
NEEDED CHANGES IN ILLINOIS
by HOWARD T. BRINTON*
INTRODUCTION

There is a move afoot to codify the rules of evidence for
use in federal district courts and other federal tribunals. The
work will be called "Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates." Copies of the proposed draft
have been printed and distributed to lawyers nationwide.' The
rules could go into effect as early as December, 1972.2 Every
practitioner, be he "office" or "trial" attorney should be aware
of these proposed rules, not only for the purpose of predicting the outcome of litigated matters in federal court for his
clients, but also for the effect these rules may have upon state
court practice in Illinois.
The proposed rules have eleven basic sections and seventysix rules with a multitude of sub-sections. The eleven sections
are entitled: General Provisions; Judicial Notice; Presumptions;
Relevancy and Its Limits; Privileges; Witnesses; Opinions and
Expert Testimony; Hearsay; Authentication and Identification;
Contents of Writings, Recordings and Photographs; and Miscellaneous Rules. They will govern all matters tried in the
federal district courts, both civil and criminal. They will apply
to matters before federal judges and magistrates, but will be
inapplicable to certain proceduresA
There will be those who will rail at the proposed rules saying
they are too liberal, and we are passing into the "ruleless limbo"
* Howard Brinton is a partner with the law firm of Wildman, Harrold,
Allen & Dixon and specializes in trial practice. He is a graduate of the
University of Wisconsin and received his J.D. from Harvard Law School.

He is a former instructor in Torts and Evidence at The John Marshall
Law School.

IAt the time of the publishing of this article the rules have been
redrafted and are pending before the Supreme Court of the United States.
The pages referred to in this article will apply to the Revised Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates,
March, 1971, as found in 51 F.R.D. 315-473 [hereinafter called Revised
Draft] ; however, if there has been a drafting change from that found in the
published version that will be cited as the "Unpublished Revised Draft."
2 The Revised Draft is to go from the Supreme Court to the Congress,
so a definite date is not possible to predict, although the Supreme Court will
not reconvene until Fall, 1972.
'The

rules do not apply to Hearings concerning preliminary questions

of fact; Grand Jury proceedings; extradition or rendition proceedings;
sentencing or granting or revoking probation; and issuance of warrants.
Rule 1101, Revised Draft, at 148, 51 F.R.D. 462.
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of an administrative hearing. There will be those who will feel
that the drafters did not go far enough. In this writer's opinion,

there will be a grain of truth in the belief of each group depending upon which section is examined. Under present law, the rule

or statute which is most receptive to the receipt of the evidence
governs, subject to some limitations. 4 As a practical matter,
many district courts allow counsel to pick the most liberal rule
from among the sixty odd jurisdictions in the United States in
determining the admissibility of evidence. The court then applies
a "seat of the pants" feeling of equity in its admission, and a
lack of predictability results.

Under the proposed rules there

will be greater predictability from court to court, although not all
the rules are the most liberal to the reception of evidence. For
example, in the area of relevancy, no evidence of subsequent

remedial measures, offers to compromise or payment of medical
expenses will be allowed in evidence against a party.5

Besides the beneficial effect which the practitioner will feel
in knowing with greater certainty which way the district court
judges will rule on a particular evidence question, the Federal
Rules of Evidence may aid the proponents of a codified system
for Illinois. 6 Those practicing in the federal district courts of

Illinois will at least have a chance to examine a code system first
hand before making a choice for themselves. 7 In deciding whether
to support codification, the practitioner should balance the desirability of random rulings upon evidence questions given by

many trial judges attempting to interpret a myriad of inconsistent cases, with a well-thought-out, well-drafted set of rules.
This article will be limited to certain of the proposed rules
which will be of interest to the Illinois practitioner either because
they represent a change from the Illinois or former federal
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a):

EVIDENCE
(a) Form and Admissibility. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by
these rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under
the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in
equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general
jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held. In any
case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence
governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be
determined in like manner.
Proposed changes to this rule at 156 Revised Draft, 51 F.R.D. 470.
' Rules 407, 408 and 409, Revised Draft at 38-40, 51 F.R.D. 352-4.
These rules will be discussed in detail infra.
6 The author admits to being such a proponent.
The following states have codified their Rules of Evidence: California,
Colorado, Maryland, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and
Washington.
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practice, or because a completely new approach has been taken
by the drafters. The Dead Man's Act, Impeachment, Expert
Testimony, Privileges, Relevancy and the Hearsay Rule and its
exceptions will be discussed.
DEAD MAN'S ACT
The
with an
Perhaps
corridors

proposed Federal Rules of Evidence would do away
anachronism of the law The Dead Man's Act."
no fresher breath could be blown through the dusty
of our practice.

The gist of the Dead Man's Act is to seal the lips of surviving parties or witnesses, who might lie about a dead or incompetent person or about events or transactions in which that
person had participated. The purpose of this rule was to prevent
fraud upon the court.9 However, the need for the Act has been
frequently challenged.' 0
The Dead Man's Act is now of only historical importance, as
it emerged as a force in the common law long before modern
discovery methods. How it has withstood the scholarly impact
against it is of some wonder. Perhaps proposed Federal Rule
601 will help inter the Act permanently:
General Rule of Competency
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules."
Nowhere in the rules does an exception dealing with the
dead or incompetent appear, and the drafters say this in their
comment to Rule 601:
This general ground-clearing eliminates all grounds of incompetency not specifically recognized in the succeeding rules of this
Article. Included among the grounds thus abolished are religious
belief, conviction of crime, and connection with the litigation as
a party or interested person or spouse of a party or interested
person. With the exception of the so-called Dead Man's Acts,
American jurisdictions generally have ceased to recognize these
grounds.
The Dead Man's Acts are surviving traces of the common law
disqualification of parties and interested persons. They exist in
variety too great to convey conviction of their wisdom and effectiveness. These rules contain no provision of this kind. For the
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §2 (1969).
The Act also applies to incompetency of a person, not simply death as the name implies.
9 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §578 (3rd ed. 1940).
10 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §1576 (3rd ed. 1940).
1 Revised Draft at 70, 51 F.R.D. 384.
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reasoning underlying the decision not to give effect to state statutes
in diversity cases, see the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 501.12

However, this will now mean that the surviving physician
who is a defendant in a wrongful death action sounding in malpractice will not be able to testify in his own behalf in the state
courts of Illinois, but will be allowed to do so in the federal district courts. This same physician will be able to rebut plaintiff's
experts with his own in the state court, but the man who knows
the most about the occurrence will still be disqualified. Certainly,
13
a similar change is required in Illinois to prevent injustice.
IMPEACHMENT
Of Your Own Witness
What trial attorney has not been stung by the shifting testimony of a witness whom he has put on the stand, and then heard
these fateful words when attempting to refresh the witness's
memory:
Opposing Counsel: Your Honor, I object - He's trying to impeach his own witness.
Court: Sustained
- you put him on the stand, counsel - he's
4
your witness.1

Such words will no longer be heard in the federal district
courts if the proposed rules pass. Rule 607 provides:
Who May Impeach
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party,
15
including the party calling him.

The drafters' comment following the rule indicates that the
prevailing rule is based upon the false premise that a party
really has a choice as to the witnesses whom he will call in a case.
The comment is certainly correct, as many witnesses have never
been under, or have left the control of a particular party; nevertheless, they have specific knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence which is material to the matters at issue. 16
12

Id.

Or why not adopt the Connecticut position, which has abolished the
Dead Man's Act, but allows hearsay statements of the decedent or incompetent into evidence. Joanis v. Engstrom, 135 Conn. 248, 63 A.2d 151
(1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-172.
14 In Illinois courts, if the attorney is surprised by statements inconsistent with what the witness made in pre-trial preparation, he may call
his attention to the statements to attempt to refresh the recollection of his
own witness. People v. Wesley, 18 Ill. 2d 138, 163 N.E.2d 500 (1960).
Incidently, there has never been a rule in Illinois preventing a party from
contradicting his own witness by the inconsistent testimony of another
witness. Moore v. Miller, 2 Ill. App. 2d 523, 119 N.E.2d 545 (1954).
15 Revised Draft at 74, 51 F.R.D. 388.
16 Id.
13
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Although the Illinois courts still pay lip-service to the old
rule, there has been a substantial inroad made upon it in the
form of what is called "Section 60" examination. 17 This allows
a party to interrogate another party or witness sufficiently
identified with that party as if under cross-examination. In
addition, the examining party is not bound by the testimony
of that witness and may impeach him. But what exists in
Illinois is in the nature of "half a loaf." The objection to impeachment of a party's own witness is still good in Illinois as
to an "independent" witness, unless the examiner is "surprised"
and can refresh the witness's memory.
There is a rough equivalent of the state practice found in
the present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43(b) provides:
(b) Scope of Examination and Cross-Examination. A party
may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him
by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects
as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus
called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the
adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse
party only upon the subject matter of his examination in chief. 18
In practice the rule has been unsatisfactory, as it left too much
to the trial judge's discretion in declaring a witness "hostile"
or in interpreting what a "managing agent" is. Rule 43 (b) will
no longer exist if the proposed rules are adopted.'" The proposed federal rule is the better one as the drafters understand
that each witness is presented in order to add further color to
the factual picture being painted by the parties, and if the artist
wishes to paint over a particular part he should be allowed to
do so. This in no way prevents comment upon the witness's
demeanor and credibility in opposing counsel's closing argu20
ment.
17
(Examination of adverse party or agent.) Upon the trial of any
case any party thereto or any person for whose immediate benefit the
action is prosecuted or defended, or the officers, directors managing
agents or foreman of any party to the action, may be called and examined as if under cross-examination at the instance of any adverse
party. The party calling for the examination is not concluded thereby
but may rebut the testimony thus given by countertestimony and may
impeach the witness by proof of prior inconsistent statements.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §60 (1971).
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (b).
19 Revised Draft at 156-57 F.R.D. 470-71.
20 Rule 611 (c)
also comes into play here and reads as follows:
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on
the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to de-

velop his testimony.

Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted
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Substantive Evidence
In Illinois, impeachment by prior inconsistent statement
does not rise to the level of "substantive" evidence. This means

that in considering a directed verdict, judgment n.o.v. or new
trial, the court may not use impeaching testimony in the same
manner as direct testimony. It is said that such impeachment
21
is not of value except as it affects the credibility of the witness.
This has always seemed nonsensical as facts are facts, regardless
of when or where spoken.

In the comment to Rule 801,22 the drafters seem to feel that
the proposed rules would eliminate this barrier, and that prior
inconsistent statements would be substantive evidence.23 This

seems the better rule as the average juror is hard pressed to
understand evidence admitted for a limited purpose.

Rule in the Queen's Case
To a practitioner in any court, one of the most difficult and
unreasonable rules has been the requirement that a cross-examiner, before attempting to impeach a witness with a prior

inconsistent statement, either oral or in writing, show the stateon cross-examination. In civil cases, a party is entitled to call an adverse party or witness identified with him and interrogate by leading
questions.
Revised Draft at 81, 51 F.R.D. 395.
Another interesting question is whether or not the objection to leading
questions should be done away with and all witnesses questioned as if under
cross-examination.
This would shorten trials and simplify questioning
immensely. However, the subject is too narrow to discuss here.
21 People v. Dandridge, 120 Ill. App. 2d 209, 256 N.E.2d 676 (1970).
This assumes, of course, both that the witness is not a party and the impeachment has not risen to the level of an admission.
22 Revised Draft at 99, 51 F.R.D. 413.
For a full recitation of the rule
see text at notes 63-66 infra.
23 Comment to Rule 801:
(i)
Prior inconsistent statements traditionally have been admissible
to impeach but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule they are
substantive evidence. As has been said by the California Law Revision
Commission with respect to a similar provision:
"Section 1235 admits inconsistent statements of witnesses because
the dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect are
largely nonexistent. The declarant is in court and may be examined
and cross-examined in regard to his statements and their subject matter.
In many cases, the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than
the testimony of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in
time to the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced
by the controversy that gave rise to the litigation. The trier of fact
has the declarant before it and can observe his demeanor and the
nature of his testimony as he denies or tries to explain away the
inconsistency. Hence, it is in as good a position to determine the
truth or falsity of the prior statement as it is to determine
the truth or falsity of the inconsistent testimony given in court.
Moreover, Section 1235 will provide a party with desirable protection
against the "turncoat" witness who changes his story on the stand and
deprives the party calling him of evidence essential to his case."
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ment to the witness or call the witness's attention to it. Illinois
4
2
follows this rule.

This rule is a definite impediment to effective cross-examimation and gives a helping hand to the courthouse prevaricator. The rule comes from England and is found in the Queen's
Case.25 It has been abolished by statute in the land of its birth.
The proposed rules attempt to put the requirement to rest by
Rule 613:
PriorStatements of Witnesses
(a) Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement. In
examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by him,
whether written or not, the statement need not be shown or its
contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same
shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of
Witness. Extrinsic evidence of -a prior inconsistent statement by
a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is
afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to
26
admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801 (d) (2).

It is this writer's opinion that even the foundation requirement in (b) is unnecessary, as the opposing party's counsel has
a right to examine the statement and conduct his own examina-

tion concerning it.

The rule already goes that far for party-

opponents, as admissions are exempted. It would seem wiser,
since a prior inconsistent statement will be substantive evidence

under the proposed rules, to allow it in and then give the party
against whom it cuts a chance to attack its weight. The jury
should be allowed to decide the ultimate fact.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Experts
With the substantial increase in litigated matters which

require the use of experts, this area becomes one of prime imporComment, California Evidence Code §1235. See also McCormick §39.
The Advisory Committee finds these views more convincing than those
expressed in People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646, 68 Cal.Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d
111 (1968) The constitutionality of the Advisory Committee's view was
upheld in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d
489 (1970)
Moreover, the requirement that the statement be inconsistent with the testimony given assures a thorough exploration of both
versions while the witness is on the stand and bars any general and
indiscriminate use of previously prepared statements.
Revised Draft at 101-02, 51 F.R.D. 415-16.
24 Illinois Central R.R. v. Wade, 206 Ill. 523, 69 N.E. 565 (1903)
Boeker v. Hess, 34 Ill. App. 332 (1889).
25 2 Bros. and B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).
26 Revised Draft at 85-86, 51 F.R.D. 399-400.
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tance in the new rules. The practitioner should take particular
note of Rule 702 which defines an "expert":
Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-

sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form
27

of an opinion or otherwise.

The proposed federal rule is quite clear and unequivocable,
but in the comment to it, the Committee notes that Rule 702
does not allow all opinions, but only those which are relevant to
the issue of fact and do not waste time. 28 The comment also interprets the rule so that the expert need not give an opinion, but
may testify as to principles and facts and let the trier of fact
29
make the necessary inference.
To further clarify the procedures in the use of experts, the
Committee has formulated Rule 704 which allows an expert to
give an opinion on an "ultimate issue":
Opinion on Ultimate Issue
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate is-

sue to be decided by the trier of fact.30

It is rewarding to see that the drafters have put to rest the
rather meaningless and nonsensical objection: "I object - that
is the ultimate question." What is an expert present to answer,
if not one of the ultimate questions? If he is truly an expert and
is needed because the area of testimony is outside of the knowledge of the average juror, then he must of necessity tread in the
area of the ultimate questions., 1
The Hypothetical Question
Once last year while trying a case in a northern county of
Illinois, the author sat through a hypothetical question addressed
to a neurologist which lasted thirty-five minutes. The effect of
that ponderous procedure on a lay jury, the court, the attorneys
and the witness was literally stupifying. If cross-examination is
such a valuable tool, then it should be utilized to discover the
27 Revised Draft at 89, 51 F.R.D. 403.
28 Id.

29Id.
30 Revised Draft at 91, 51 F.R.D. 405.
81 Illinois has started toward this enlightened position.
bury Co., 33 Ill. 2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965).

Miller v. Pills-
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basis for the opinion of an expert called by an adverse party. To
that end, proposed Federal Rule 705 provides as follows:
Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may
to disclose the underlying facts or data
in any event be required
32
on cross-examination.

The reader will see that this leaves the use of the hypothetical question within the discretion of the trial judge. It would
seem the better rule to do away with the hypothetical question
altogether and not leave it within the already vast discretionary
powers of a multitude of federal district judges. Hopefully, most
judges will use the system which saves the most time and is the
least confusing to the jury.3a
The hypothetical question in Illinois has a checkered history,
but it is clear that under present case law, the lengthy procedure
is still required.24 In this writer's opinion, the continuance of
35
such a laborious and unfair procedure should be halted.
Privileges
The only way to begin to understand this new set of rules is
to begin with a consideration of Rule 501:
Privileges Recognized Only as Provided
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in
these rules or in other rules adopted by the Supreme Court, no
person has a privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any
matter or producing any object or writing3 6
This comment appears after the rule to more fully explain
the drafters' reasoning:
32 Revised Draft at 92. 51 F.R.D. 406.
33 In this counsel's practice, several of the federal district judges in the
Northern District of Illinois have adopted this shorter procedure, before the
passage of the rule.
34 Pritchett v. Steinkor Trucking Co., 108 Ill. App. 2d 371, 247 N.E.2d
923 (1969).
3 The "unfair" nature of the procedure is that it gives the party
employing it numerous opportunities to present its theory of the case between
opening statement and closing argument.
36 Revised Draft at 42, 51 F.R.D. 356.
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With respect to federal question litigation, the supremacy of
federal law may be less clear, yet indications that state privileges
are inapplicable preponderate in the circuits . . . [citing cases].
While a number of the cases arise from administrative income tax
investigations, they nevertheless support the broad proposition of
the inapplicability of state privileges in federal proceedings.
In view of these considerations, it is apparent that, to the extent that they accord state privileges standing in federal criminal
cases, bankruptcy, and federal question cases, the rules go beyond
what previously has been thought necessary or proper.
On the other hand, in diversity cases, or perhaps more accurately cases in which state law furnishes the rule of decision,
the rules avoid giving state privileges the effect which substantial
authority has thought necessary and proper. Regardless of what
might once have been thought to be the command of Eric R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 61, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), as to
observance of state created privileges in diversity cases, Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965), is believed to locate the problem in the area of choice rather than necessity. Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future,
1 Ga.L.REV. 563, 572-573 (1967).
Contra, Republic Gear Co. v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555, n. 2 (2d Cir. 1967), and see
authorities there cited. Hence all significant policy factors need
7
to be considered in order that the choice may be a wise one.
Therefore, there are no privileges except as outlined by
these Rules, Constitutional Privileges, or ones adopted by Congress.
The major privileges recognized are:

1. Lawyer-Client (Rule 503)38
2.
3.

Psychotherapist-Patient (Rule 504)39
Husband-Wife (Rule 505)40

4.

Trade Secrets (Rule 508)

5.

Identity of Informer (Rule 510)42

31 Revised
38 Revised
39 Revised
40 Revised
41 Revised
42 Revised
vised Draft at

41

Draft at 44, 51 F.R.D. 358.
Draft at 47-48, 51 F.R.D. 361-62.
Draft at 52-53, 51 F.R.D. 366-67.
Draft at 55, 51 F.R.D. 369.
Draft at 60, 51 F.R.D. 374.
Draft at 64-65, 51 F.R.D. 378-79. We reprint Rule 503, Re47-48, 51 F.R.D. 361-62, which is representative of the others.
LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is
rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him.
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed
by the client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(3) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to
obtain professional legal services and to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client.
(4) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist
the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services.
(5) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be dis-
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4 3
These privileges may be waived by voluntary disclosure
but not if the privileged material was disclosed by erroneous compulsion or without an opportunity to claim the privilege. 4 4 In
addition, no comment may be made by the court or counsel upon
the claim of privilege, and no inference may be drawn therefrom. 4 5 The questions to be determined by future cases will
mainly concern the interpretation of the privileges as granted
and their restrictions.

Illinois has recognized all of the major privileges listed
46
above in varying degrees for a number of years by statute.
However, Illinois also has recognized a modified physician-patient
closed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in
futherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client
or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(b)
General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client, (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (2) between
his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, or (3) by him or his lawyer
to a lawyer representating another in a matter of common interest, or
(4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client.
(c)
Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed
by the client, his guardian or conservator, the personal representative
of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative
of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in
existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client. His
authority to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
(1)
Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the
lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or
plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known
to be a crime or fraud; or
(2)
Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the
same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate
or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or
(3)
Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client
or by the client to his lawyer.
(4)
Document Attested by Lawyer. As to a communication
relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the
lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(5)
Joint Clients. As a communication relevant to a matter
of common interest between two or more clients if the communication
was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common,
when offered in an action between any of the clients.
The others recognized are: Required Reports Privileged by Statute, Rule
502, Revised Draft at 46, 51 F.R.D. 360. Communications to Clergymen,
Rule 506, Revised Draft at 57-58, 51 F.R.D. 371-72. Political Vote, Rule
507, Revised Draft at 59, 51 F.R.D. 373. Military and State Secrets, Rule
509, Revised Draft at 61-62, 51 F.R.D. 375-76.
43 Rule 511, Revised Draft at 67, 51 F.R.D. 381.
44 Id.

45 Rule 513, Revised Draft at 68, 51 F.R.D. 382.
46

See for example, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §§5, 5.1 and 5.2 (1971).
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privilege4 7 and an accountant's privilege.4 Apparently, no such
privileges will now exist in matters coming under federal jurisdiction.
RELEVANCY
With the exception of the codification of the Hearsay Rule,
the most radical changes from a trial lawyer's point of view are
found in the area of what is relevant evidence. The outer limits
of relevancy are bounded only by the ingenuity of attorneys who
try cases. This writer's experience with other attorneys tells
him that their ingenuity is infinite in variety and scope. 49 Therefore, while the courts of most jurisdictions have become involved
in convoluted definitions of relevancy and have engrafted exceptions upon exceptions in application, the drafters of the rules
have cut cleanly into that knot. Their initial definition is spare,
50
taking the best from the most scholarly definitions :
Definition of "Relevant Evidence"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deprobable or less probable than it
termination of the action more
51
would be without the evidence.
Then this broad based idea taken from Professor Thayer
follows as Rule 402:
Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible;
Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by these rules, by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court,
by Act of Congress, or by the Constitution of 52the United States.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
However, the crux is found in Rule 403, which provides:
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice,Confusion, or Waste of Time
(a) Exclusion Mandatory. Although relevant, evidence is
not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
41 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §5.1 (1971).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/, §51 (1971).
9
4 In Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23,
48

11 N.E. 938 (1887), Mr. Justice
Holmes concedes that some restrictions must be placed on relevancy as "a
concession to the shortness of life."
50 "Relevance . . . is . . . probative worth . .. ," C. McCORMICK, LAW OF
"Legal relevance denotes something more
EVIDENCE, §151, at 314 (1954).
than a minimum of probative value but something less than full proof, sometime to lay before the jury." 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§28 and 29, (3rd
ed. 1940).
51 Rule 401, Revised Draft at 28, 51 F.R.D. 342.
52 Revised Draft at 29, 51 F.R.D. 343, THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE 264 (1898).
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the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of
misleading the jury.
(b) Exclusion Discretionary. Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pre3
sentation of cumulative evidence.5
At page 8 of the unpublished draft now pending before the
Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 403 has been revised
as follows:
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice,Confusion, or Waste of Time
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation
54
of cumulative evidence.
It is unfortunate that the drafters have seen fit to expand
the discretionary functions of federal district courts even in this
limited area. With such vast discretionary powers subject to so
much abuse already resting with the federal courts in the areas
of change of venue, comment on the evidence and unlimited powers to grant a new trial, to grant more is unwise.
No matter in what form the rule is finally adopted, it should
be called the "Rule of Expediency," because it is an artificial concept developed by the courts to save time. This rule has now
risen to the level of codification and even sub-classification. What
was probably formed in some judge's mind on a hot sleepy afternoon when the evidence had dragged on and on, is now a rule of
the finest court system in the land. What can it be called but
the "Rule of Expediency" when it starts out, "Although relevant... "? Any evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to prove
or disprove a fact in issue in the cause. 5 Then why keep it out?
The answer can best be found in some concrete situations found
in three Illinois cases.
In Chicago Union Traffic Co. v. Arnold51 contradictory evidence of the nature of the plaintiff's injuries was offered through
the testimony of two physicians, who were in disagreement over
53 Revised Draft at 31, 51 F.R.D. 345.
5

4 Unpublished Draft at 8.
55 The reader should be aware of the difference between relevancy and
materiality. To judge whether something offered is material you must see
if it is probative on an issue in the case. If not, then it is immaterial. You
must consider materiality first; then and only then can you consider relevancy.
6 131 Ill. App. 599 (1907).
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the nature and extent of the injuries suffered. The appellate
court directed that upon remand the trial court should exclude
any evidence presented on the issue which, though relevant to
plaintiff's injuries, would have the effect of confusing the jury
and affecting their verdict.
In Hulsebus v. Russian,57 a photograph of the plaintiff was
refused as evidence. Plaintiff was injured in an auto accident
and appealed when one of the two defendants was found not to
be liable. The court affirmed the exclusion of the photo, which
was one depicting the plaintiff in surgical process and in the
court's language was a "gory and hideous sight." The court
noted not only the inflamatory and prejudicial nature of the evidence, but also stated that the photo had no bearing on the jury's
not finding the defendant liable.
The court affirmed the exclusion of evidence in Woodrick v.
Smith Gas 8 as well. In that case the defendant contended that
certain motion pictures would graphically show that an auto device was correctly installed when the malfunctioning of that device caused the accident injuring the plaintiff. The appellate
court decided that the trial judge's discretion in refusing such
pictures as evidence of a merely cumulative nature would not be
disturbed.
Character
Having considered the above examples, an examination of
some specific sub-classifications of Relevancy as found in the
rules follows. For law students, learning the rules of evidence
in the areas of character, habit and reputation, is second only in
difficulty to the Hearsay Rule and its exceptions. However, at
least in the area of character, the proposed rules make it easier.
Rule 404 is a not very surprising codification of most existing case law and deals with general character of an accused victim or witness and crimes, wrongs or acts:
CharacterEvidence Not Admissible To Prove
Conduct, Exceptions; Other Crimes
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait
of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same;
5T 118 Ill. App. 2d 174, 254 N.E.2d 184 (1969).
58 87 Ill. App. 2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967).
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Evidence of a pertinent trait

of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same;

(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of
a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. 59

Unfortunately, this rule when used in conjunction with Rule
608 apparently allows the use of the most unreliable character
evidence in civil cases. Rule 608 provides:
Evidence of Characterand Conduct of Witness
(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence
in the form of reputation or opinion, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2), except with respect to an accused
who testifies in his own behalf, evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness
has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however,
if clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not remote in time, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
himself or on cross-examination of a witness who testifies to his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any
other witness, does not operate as a waiver of his privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.60

59 Revised Draft at 32, 51 F.R.D. 346.
60

Revised Draft at 74-75, 51 F.R.D. 388 (emphasis added).

This

writer prefers the comment from the California Law Revision Committee

which follows the drafters' comment to Rule 404:

The argument is made that circumstantial use of character ought
to be allowed in civil cases to the same extent as in criminal cases, i.e.

evidence of good (nonprejudicial) character would be admissible in the
first instance, subject to rebuttal by evidence of bad character. Falknor,

Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 Rutgers L.Rev. 574, 581-83
(1956); Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Art. VI. Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility), Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep., Rec. & Studies, 657-58
(1964).
Uniform Rule 47 goes farther, in that it assumes that
character evidence in general satisfies the conditions of relevancy, except
as provided in Uniform Rule 48. The difficulty with expanding the
use of character evidence in civil cases is set forth by the California
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Thus the drafters have perpetuated and even broadened an
area of highly unreliable evidence - the opinion of a witness as
to another witness's truthfulness.
Rule 404 must also be read in conjunction with Rule 405
which allows evidence of character or traits of a witness by
reputation or opinion:
Methods of Proving Character
(a)

Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence

of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof
may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the
form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable
into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b)

Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which charac-

ter or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a
charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of his conductA1
Note that cross-examination is permitted into relevant specific
instances of conduct in subparagraph (a), and if character is
"in issue" proof may always be made by specific instances of the
witness's conduct.
It is foreseeable that a great deal of case law will evolve
from this rather simple three sentence rule. Also it would seem
that all of the elements under Rule 403 (the general Rule of Expediency) would come into play in attempts to prove character.
For example, Rule 405 may mean that in a rape case the other
transgressions of the victim could be specifically brought out as
shedding light on the question of consent. 62 If specific acts were
shown, the party presenting the witness would presumably have
a right to rebut each specific act, so that the main trial could run
Law Revision Commission in its ultimate rejection of Uniform Rule
47, id. 615:
"Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very
prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question
of what actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits
the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man
because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the
case shows actually happened."
Much of the force of the position of those favoring greater use of
character evidence in civil cases is dissipated by their support of
Uniform Rule 48 which excludes the evidence in negligence cases, where
it could be expected to achieve its maximum usefulness. Moreover,
expanding concepts of "character," which seem of necessity to extend
into such areas as psychiatric evaluation and psychological testing,
coupled with expanded admissibility, would open up such vistas of mental
examinations as caused the Court concern in Schlagenhauf v. Holder,
379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964). It is believed that
those espousing change have not met the burden of persuasion.
Revised Draft at 33-34, 51 F.R.D. 347-48.
61 Rule 405, Revised Draft at 34, 51 F.R.D. 348.
62
See People v. Hankins, 90 Ill. App. 2d 51, 234 N.E.2d 104 (1967),
where such evidence is not allowed, but proof limited to general reputation
testimony.
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parallel with an infinite number of little trials. Nothing within
the rule itself seems to prevent this, but the court hopefully would
place limitations on proof under the Rule of Expediency.
Similar Occurrences
One of the more confused areas of the law within the
"pigeon-hole" of relevancy, which the proposed rules do not even
remotely consider, is the similar occurrence. For years, Illinois
and its federal district courts have followed the rule that other
prior occurrences, if substantially similar in nature, may be
shown to prove notice or common causation. 3
In Miller v. Chicago Transit Authority,64 the appellate court
held that the plaintiff should have been allowed to show prior assaults upon passengers at a subway platform in order to prove
actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition to the defendant. The court did limit such prior occurrences to those
proximately related as to both time and place.
But in two recent decisions the courts have expanded the
scope of the rule and virtually eliminated the reason behind it.65
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co.66 was a products liability action
against the manufacturer of a household drain product for the
explosion of one of its containers. In Moore, the happenings of
three other explosions of the drain product were admitted into
evidence. It was admitted that the accidents were prior to the
injury in question, but long after the product had left the manufacturer's control. The incidents were not factually identical,
nor related as to the time or place. The proof was not offered for
common causation, but for notice to the manufacturer. The appellate court said:
The defendants next contend that improper evidence was received. First, they argue that evidence of claims of prior accidents
was improperly admitted over their objection. The record reveals
that the trial court limited evidence of prior accidents to explosion
claims against defendants where there was no opening of the can
or any extraneous matter added or anything done to it. The court
not only rejected cases where water or some outside material was
63 Bloomington v. Legg, 151 Ill. 9, 37 N.E. 696 (1894); German v.
Huston, 302 Ill. App. 38, 23 N.E.2d 371 (1939) ; Miller v. CTA, 78 Ill. App.
2d 375, 223 N.E.2d 323 (1966) ; Sue v. CTA, 279 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1960)
(which cites the general rule, but rules evidence not sufficient).
64 78 Ill. App. 2d 375, 383-84, 233 N.E.2d 323, 326 (1969).
The court
held the offer of proof made by plaintiff was not sufficient.
65 Moore v. Jewel Tea, 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), afJ'd,
46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970). Inman v. The Palmer House, No.

18801 (7th Cir., Oct. 8, 1971).
66

116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969).
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added to the can, it refused plaintiffs' request to allow evidence of
prior spontaneous explosions which occurred after the Drano had
been subjected to its normal use. Under these guidelines the plaintiffs introduced evidence of three prior accidents in which a Drano
can which had not been opened exploded and after which a claim
was made against Drackett.
This evidence affects the question of actual notice or knowledge
to the defendants of the possibility of an explosion. Wolczek v.
Public Service Co., 342 Ill. 482, 500, 174 NE2d 577, 584. It is competent, not for the purpose of showing independent acts of negligence, but as tending to show that the common cause of the accidents is a dangerous and unsafe thing, City of Taylorville v. Stafford, 196 Ill. 288, 291, 63 NE 624, 625; City of Bloomington v.
Legg, Administrator, 151 Ill. 9, 13, 37 NE 696, 697. It is also
competent to show notice of this to the defendants. City of Chicago v. Jarvis, 226 Ill. 614, 617, 80 N.E. 1079, 1080. In Gall v.
Union Ice Co. (Cal App), 239 P2d 48 (1951), it was held that
evidence of the explosion of another drum of sulphuric acid was
proper to show the propensity of the drums to burst and hence
their dangerousness. While the evidence showed the claims against
Drackett were made after the can was manufactured and delivered
to Jewel, but before it was sold to the plaintiff, this fact affects the
weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility. Whether
this evidence was admissible is, of course, initially a matter for
the exercise of the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we find
no abuse of discretion.
The defendants also argue that if some evidence of claims of
prior accidents was admissible, they should have been allowed to
try the merits of such claims. The trial court prevented them from
so doing. This was entirely proper because the issue was the notice to the defendants of the prior claims and the dangerous propensities of Drano, but not the legal validity of the claims. Considering the distraction of the jury and the undue consumption of
time which would have resulted from allowing the defendants to
present evidence on the merits of the prior claims, we find that the
trial judge
did not abuse his discretion by so limiting the evi67
dence.

Unless there is an absolute duty of recall upon manufacturers extending into the retail outlet and the consumer's home, the question could be asked - notice of what? The can had been put
into the stream of commerce some eleven months before the occurrence and was on the shelf of the retail store when these
other incidents happened. The appellate court held that these
facts only effect the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility, but again the question - notice of what?
In Inman v. Palmer House,68 a man fell in a bath tub in a
67 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 129-30, 253 N.E.2d 636, 645-46 (1969)
(Emphasis
added).
68 No. 18801 (7th Cir., Oct. 8, 1971).

260

The John Marshall Journal of Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 5:242

hotel. Evidence of eleven other falls was allowed in to show notice of a dangerous or hazardous condition without regard to
similarity of circumstances or proximate relation in time or place.
Nor was the defendant allowed to put in evidence showing the
cause of the other falls, as this would have created a collateral
issue. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited Moore in support of its position.

The drafters of the rules should give aid to the various federal jurisdictions and include a rule dealing with similar occurrences, as there appears to be a trend in the case law which has
a potential for much confusion and injustice. It is suggested the
following be added as Rule 412:
Prior Occurrences: (a) Evidence of prior accidents or occurrences, if substantially identical to the facts in issue and proximately related as to time and place, may be admitted if relevant on
the issues of notice of a dangerous agency or causation.
(b)
The Court may in its discretion under Rule 403 allow the party
opponent of such evidence to rebut the same to show lack of notice
of a dangerous agency or causation.
(c) Evidence
of a lack of
69
prior occurrences or accidents may be admitted.

Habit
Habit is to be distinguished from character as reputation is

to be distinguished from character. Character is what a man is
and reputation is what his community thinks he is. Habit is
defined as his routine practice.70 What a man does the same way
over a period of time becomes routine. Rule 406 allows evidence
of the habit of a person or routine practice of an organization to
be proved by opinion or by specific instances being testified to so

as to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice
was routine. 71 There is no requirement of corroboration.

This

is certainly one of the most far-reaching rules found in the re09 Sub-paragraph
(b) of this rule has been added to prevent injustice.
What if, in fact, the claims relied upon by the proponent of the evidence
were contrived, untrue or explained by some cause other than negligence
or defect on the part of its opponent. Should not the jury hear an explanation of the "claim" similar to the rehabilitation of an impeached witness.
Sub-paragraph (c) is based on the Illinois case law allowing proof of
the "negative." Wolczek v. Public Service Co., 342 Ill. 482 174 N.E. 577
(1931) ; Hardiman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198
N.E.2d 681 (1964).

70 C. MCCORMICK,
71

EVIDENCE, §162 at 340 (1958).

Rule 406:

HABIT; ROUTINE PRACTICE
(a) Admissibility. Evidence of the habit of a person or of the
routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the
conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in
conformity with the habit or routine practice.
(b) Method of Proof. Habit or routine practice may be proved by
testimony in the form of an opinion or by specific instances of conduct
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vised draft; in fact, so much so that one must ask how opinion
testimony can provide the basis for a habit. What opinion does
the witness give? Is the opinion to be received from a "lay" witness or so-called expert? The comment fails to help answer those
questions, except to refer to Rule 701 which deals with opinion
Testimony by Lay Witnesses.12 That is not much help as subparagraph (a) merely completes the circle - an opinion of habit
must be based on personal observation and firsthand knowledge.
Proof of Habits of Decedent
A line of cases in Illinois has imposed an artificial rule upon
parties, usually in wrongful death actions. It is the rule which
prohibits surviving witnesses from testifying as to the habits of
due care of the deceased before the occurrence which caused
73
The proposed
death if that occurrence was witnessed by others.
in Rule
follows
as
providing
rules do away with this requirement
406 (a) :
Habit; Routine Practice
(a) Admissibility. Evidence of the habit of a person or of
the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to
prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particu74
lar occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
This rule should be adopted in Illinois to avoid injustice. As
it is, Illinois is one of the few states that requires that the due
care of the plaintiff or decedent be pleaded and proved before
recovery.75 Therefore, in an Illinois court at the present time, a
lone driver colliding with a vehicle driven by another decedent,
but with a damaging eyewitness present would leave the plaintiff
unable to prove the due care of the decedent. This rule is unjust
and should be modified.
sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that
the practice was routine.
Revised Draft at 35-36, 51 F.R.D. 349-50.
72Rule 701:
OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the

form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)

helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination
of a fact in issue.
Revised Draft at 88, 51 F.R.D. 402.
7 McInturff v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 102 Ill. App. 2d 39, 243 N.E.2d
657 (1968). Plank v. Holman, 46 Ill. 2d 465, 264 N.E.2d 12 (1970). Also
notice the interesting case of McElroy v. Force, 38 Ill. 2d 528, 232 N.E.2d
708 (1968), where evidence of a living plaintiff's due care was allowed because he was prohibited from testifying under the Dead Man's Act.
74 Revised Draft at 35, 51 F.R.D. 349 (emphasis added).
75

In most states it is an affirmative burden of defendant.
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Events Occurring After Injury
Three events may occur after an injury which may be
highly probative and perfectly relevant, but not allowed by a
corollary, the "Rule of Expediency," translated into public policy
arguments. They are evidence of an offer to pay medical expenses, offers of compromise and the taking of subsequent remedial matters. The first two were relatively easy for the drafters
to handle. Rule 408 provides:
Compromise and Offers To Compromise
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving
an effort to obstruct a criminal investiga76
tion or prosecution.
Rule 409 provides:
Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury.77

These are basically classic renditions of the case law and
should pose no problem in interpretation.
However, Rule 407 is a totally different matter. Evidence
of subsequent remedial measures or repairs has been excluded
in most jurisdictions on the basis of public policy. It was felt
that if evidence of repairs or corrective measures could be introduced to prove liability, then the party in a position to make the
repairs would not do So. 7 8 A look at proposed Rule 407 in its
entirety is required to see if it affects that long standing rule of
law:
Subsequent Remedial Measures
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
76 Revised Draft at 39, 51 F.R.D. 353.

77 Revised Draft at 40, 51 F.R.D. 354.
78 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §77

at 159 (1958).
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feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 9
It is suggested that with the inclusion of the italicized words
the drafters have written in a dangerous exception, which virtually engulfs the rule. As a wag one said, "Hindsight is always
20/20." The term "feasibility of precautionary measures" lends
itself to misuse by ingenious counsel, because every precautionary device, available or not, becomes feasible after an injury.
Take as an example a products liability case involving a press.
The press had been installed five years before with all safety devices known to the industry at the time. An injury occurs after
five years and a claim made against the manufacturer of the machine. The manufacturer investigates and in learning how the
accident occurred wishes to add another safety device unknown
before within the industry. Enterprising counsel for the partyproponent would attempt to present this change to the trier of
fact, saying that it shows the feasibility of the additional safety
measure at date of sale. What should be the advice of the manufacturer's counsel - make the change and become subject to liability or defer any change until after the litigation is concluded?
To consider the other side of the coin, what about the absence of additional precautionary measures being taken after
the occurrence as evidence of the feasibility of the existing precautions or as bearing on plaintiff's fault? Would that not run
afoul of the public policy considerations behind the rule ?so The
hope is that if this language is allowed to remain in the rule, it
is honed by interpretation, so the rule is not absorbed by the exception.
HEARSAY
To attempt to explain what hearsay is, is not, and its exceptions, and then pursue a discussion of the way hearsay is handled
in the proposed rules, is literally impossible in a few pages.
Therefore, a basic knowledge of the Hearsay Rule and its exceptions is assumed and this article will attempt to give the
reader a broad picture of what the drafters are attempting to
accomplish in codifying the Hearsay Rule.-1
The drafters' approach to Hearsay is a novel one and quite
exciting in concept. For over a year both in the classroom and
the courtroom this writer has attempted to apply their way of
79 Revised Draft at 38, 51 F.R.D. 352 (emphasis added).
80
See Wolczek v. Public Service Co., 342 Ill. 482, 174 N.E. 577 (1931).
81 The reader should be reminded that the historical reasons for the
prohibition against hearsay have been (a) lack of an oath, (b) inability of

trier of fact to judge the demeanor of an absent witness and (c) lack of
the right of cross-examination.
(1954).

C. McCORMICK,

EVIDENCE

§224 at 457-58
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approaching hearsay problems, and predicts that theirs will be a
practical success as well as a conceptual one.
The Committee's revised draft begins where all scholars
have begun, with a definition, but that is where the similarity
ends. The drafters not only tell you what Hearsay is, but tell
you specifically what it is not. To begin with, a look at the
definitions is suggested:
Definitions
The following definitions apply under this Article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.82
The hearsay "rule" itself is quite simple.
Hearsay Rule
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
rules adopted by the Supreme Court or by Act of Conby other
3
gress.

The first thing which must be asked is, "Is the statement hearsay?" There is nothing novel in that approach, and there is no
problem in a non-hearsay statement fitting in under the phrase
"offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
For example, if the issue is whether a person had the ability to
speak after an occurrence, testimony as to what that person said
is admissible, not for the truth of what was said, but for the fact
8 4
that he could speak. That is non-hearsay.
In Rule 801 (d), the drafters tell you what further statements are not hearsay:
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is
not hearsay if
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (i) inconsistent with
his testimony, or (ii) consistent with his testimony and is offered
to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (iii) one of identification of a person made soon after perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is
offered against a party and is (i) his own statement, in either
82 Rule 801, Revised Draft at 99, 51 F.R.D. 413.
83 Rule 802, Revised Draft at 104, 51 F.R.D. 418-19.
84 Don't be confused by sub-section (2) of 801, concerning non-verbal
conduct, as the drafters are probably referring to a line of cases concerning
identification in a police line-up.
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his individual or a representative capacity, or (ii) a statement of
which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or
(iii) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (iv) a statement by his agent
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or
(v) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy.8
The logic of subparagraph (d) (1) above, which deals with
impeachment, rehabilitation and line-ups, seems inescapable, as
the only thing missing is the declarant's oath at the time of making the statement. He is present for the trier of fact to judge his
credibility and may be cross-examined at the trial or hearing.
As to subparagraph (2), the reliability of admissions made
in the five categories set out by the drafters would seem to mitigate against classifying them as hearsay. The rule does not
even change the law of Illinois. 6
From this point on the concept changes and we find the proposed federal rules dividing hearsay into those situations where
the availability of the declarant is immaterial and where the
declarant is unavailable. The rules recognize twenty-nine basic
exceptions, and the drafters divide them as follows:
Availability of Declarant7 Immaterial8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Present Sense Impression.
Excited Utterance.
Then Existing Mental, Emotional or Physical Condition.
Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.
Recorded Recollection.
Records of Regularly Conducted Activity.
Absence of Entry in Records of Regularly Conducted
Activity.
Public Records and Reports.
Records of Vital Statistics.
Absence of Public Record or Entry.
Records of Religious Organizations.
Marriage, Baptismal and Similar Certificates.
Family Records.
Records of Documents Affecting an Interest in Property.
Statements in Documents Affecting an Interest in Property.
Statements in Ancient Documents.
85 Revised Draft at 99, 51 F.R.D. 413.
86 Buttitta v. Lawrence, 346 11. 164, 178 N.E. 390 (1931) ; People v.

Miller, 278 Ill. 490, 116 N.E. 131 (1917); Mix v. Osby, 62 Ill. 193 (1871).
87 "Declarant" is the person who makes the statement as defined by
Rule 801(b), Revised Draft at 99, 51 F.R.D. 413.
88 Rule 803, Revised Draft at 105-08, 51 F.R.D. 419-22.
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19.
20.
21.
22.
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Market Reports, Commercial Publications.
Learned Treatises.
Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History.
Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History.
Reputation as to Character.
Judgment of Previous Conviction.
Judgment as to Personal, Family or General History, or
Boundaries.

Exception 24 is the "catch-all" exception which covers all
statements not specifically covered by any of the foregoing ex9
ceptions, if there are comparable guarantees of trustworthiness
Declarant Unavailable
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Former Testimony.
Statement of Recent Perception.
Statement Under Belief of Impending Death.
Statement Against Interest.
Statement of Personal or Family History.
Other Exceptions. 0

Declarant Unavailable
In this area there are two basic changes which deserve attention before delving into the more complicated area of the immateriality of the availability of the declarant. The first is found
in the definition of Unavailability.
Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable
(a)

Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a wit-

ness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) Is exempted by ruling of the judge on the ground of
privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his
statement; or
(2)
Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject
matter of his statement despite an order of the judge to do so; or

(3)

Testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of

his statement; or
(4)
Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing
because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or
infirmity; or
89 Rule 803, Revised Draft at 108, 51 F.R.D. 422:
(24) Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by
any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.
90 Revised Draft at 124-25, F.R.D. 438-39. The sixth sub-paragraph
of the rule is similar to exception 24 of Rule 803 cited above. The reader
should remember that if the evidence does not fit under a particular exception, it may fit under another, and he may use the rules as a type of "check
list" for admission of evidence.
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(5)
Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process
or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption,
refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to
the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement
for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 91

Sub-section (3) of the rule is troublesome because one can
foresee a situation in which a retrial has been granted to a party
and suddenly the most damaging witness develops a startling
loss of memory concerning his testimony, thereby allowing his
testimony from the first trial to be read under the former testimony exception. The fact that additional information which
would aid greatly in the cross-examination of the witness has
been found between the first trial and the second is thought to
be the reason for the convenient loss of memory. 2 Are there
any protections within the rule to prevent this? If the claim
of lack of memory can be shown to be because of the wrongdoing of the proponent the witness is determined to be available.
But how effective a sanction it this? What trial judge without
overwhelming evidence could apply such a rule?
Sub-section (5) of Rule 804 (a) leaves out the necessity for
the party-proponent to attempt the witness's deposition before he
can be declared unavailable. This should be a minimum requirement. This section deserves a reworking for protection of all
93
litigants in situations of this type.
The second change in this area has been much needed for
years. In most jurisdictions, including Illinois, for a declaration
against interest to be admissible it must be against a witness's
pecuniary, not penal interest. 94 The general rule has been felt
by many to be an absurd one, since it appears to be a reverse
reading of what human beings usually or normally do. Rule
804(b) (4) allows into evidence declarations against interest
which would tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability s
This includes confessions made by others to crimes of which the
accused is charged. There is a serious question of whether or
Rule 804 (a), Revised Draft at 124, 51 F.R.D. 438.
92 Such a case may truly exist, see Rio Grande Southern Ry. v. Campbell,
55 Colo. 493, 136, at 68 (1913).
93 Illinois has maintained the stricter rule in People v. Cox, 87 Ill. App.
2d 243, 230 N.E.2d 900 (1967), where even though a key witness was declared legally incompetent a defendant could not be denied the right of
confrontation in a criminal case.
94 A declaration against interest is made only by a non-party and should
not be confused with an admission or confession. An illustrative Illinois
case explaining the exception is Frazier v. Dan Burks, 95 Ill. App. 2d 51,
238 N.E.2d 78 (1968).
95 Revised Draft at 124-25, 51 F.R.D. 438-39.
91
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not this is the law in Illinois, which supposedly excludes such
evidence on the grounds that it is untrustworthy as a matter of

law.9
Availability of Declarant Immaterial
Of the twenty-three enumerated exceptions under this subclassification, probably the majority merit attention. However,
time and space limit the comments to only a few. These can be
97
divided into five basic areas of interest.
The Outmoded Res Gestae Exception

This res gestae exception is found in the first two exceptions,
which are:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition.98
Res gestae has been defined as those statements or declara-

tions which are made spontaneously or contemporaneously with
and as a part of a transaction, event or condition to which they
relate.99 The Committee feels that sub-sections (1) and (2) are
more workable rules, although the drafters admit that they overlap. The Committee comment on exception (1) indicates that it
is the better rule because the chances for fabrication are less due
to the immediacy of the statement, and there is either a chance
to cross-examine the declarant or the person who allegedly heard
it.100 Unfortunately, the Committee either cannot or does not
choose to explain what the words "or immediately thereafter"
mean. It is foreseeable that those words will be extended by the
courts to mean as long as 30 seconds, three minutes, three hours
or three days.1°1
This case
90 People v. Lettrick, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952).
states the general rule, but allowed the other confession in the interest of
justice. A later case held that a confession by another defendent has high
probative value but is not conclusive and must be weighed in the same
manner as other evidence.
07 (1)
The outmoded res gestae exceptions; (2) Improving upon State
of Mind exceptions; (3) Treatises and Textbooks; (4) Judgment of Previous
Conviction; and (5) Business Records Exceptions.
98 Rule 803(1)-(2), Revised Draft at 105, 51 F.R.D. 419.
99 GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL, 191, Rule 165 (1963).
100 Comment, Revised Draft at 109, 51 F.R.D. 423.
1o Braden v. Rosenstone, 83 N.J.L. 251, 83 A. 906 (1912), where "immediately thereafter" was interpreted to mean "directly" or "at once" and
not within a reasonable time. Yet in Whitehead v. Moch, 85 N.J.L. 574, 89
A. 981 (1914), the court found the space of an evening to be reasonable under
the circumstances.
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Whether it is called "spontaneous declaration" or "excited
utterance," the thrust of exception (2) remains the same. It
is a variation of exception (1), but, as the Committee comment
'10 2
recites, it is placed here to avoid "needless niggling."
The grounds for the reliability of exception (2) are the
same as that of the present sense impression, that is that the
situation produces utterances free of conscious fabrication. 0 3
The drafters' comment suggests that this rule has been criticized
because of unconscious fabrication due to the same excitement.
In addition, note that the utterance need not be made by one
participatingin the event or occurrence. 04
This set of facts may be assumed to test the rather brief
language of exception (2). The defendant, in a case involving
an automobile collision at a controlled intersection, produces a
non-party witness who testifies that an unidentified declarant
excitedly told him right after the impact that "the red (plaintiff's) car went through the red light." All tests for an excited
utterance have been met: declarant - under stress from a startling event which has occurred - availability immaterial. But
what of the right of cross-examination - the reliability of the
declarant's conclusion. Is it not just as likely that someone
told the declarant what happened, that he saw it wrong under
stress, or that the witness at trial erroneously repeated what
the declarant told him.
Applying these same facts to exception (1), Present Sense
Impression, would appear to make exception (2) seem superfluous. Perhaps the drafters should combine (1) and (2) and
come up with an exception which would either make this type
of evidence more reliable or do away with it all together. As
an alternative, they should place these exceptions into the "declarant unavailable" category with all its restrictions.
Improving Upon the State of Mind Exception
Historically, an exception has been recognized to the hearsay rule called "State of Mind or Statement of Intent." 10 The
drafters handle it in this manner:
(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including
102
103
104

Comment, Revised Draft at 109, 51 F.R.D. 423.

Id.
Id.

10 Illinois has recognized it for years.
146, 94 N.E. 50 (1911).

Wilkinson v. Service, 249 II.
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a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.106

The drafters call this a "specialized application of exception (1)
presented separately to enhance its usefulness and acceptability.107 They say that the phrase "but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered" is
necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule
which would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable from a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of
mind.10 8 There is "an exception to the exception" in that it does
not apply to the execution, revocation, identification or terms of a
declarant's will.' 0 9
The comment on exception (3) cites Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hillman,110 and says that the case law is untouched. In Hillman,
Mrs. Hillman brought actions against insurance companies on
life insurance policies insuring her husband's life. The defense
was that the plaintiff's husband was not in fact dead, and this
was an attempt to defraud the insurance companies. The alleged
decedent went west to travel and was purportedly killed, but the
identity of his corpse was at issue, the defense contending that
the body was one Walters. Among the evidence introduced to
prove that the corpse was Walters were letters which were
written by Walters. These letters were introduced to show the
intention of the writer to travel at a certain locale at certain
dates, thus putting him at the site of the death. The defendant
said this tended to establish his identity as the deceased. The
court decided that the letters were properly admissible and held
that,
Wherever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings are
original and competent evidence. Those expressions are the natural
reflexes of what might be impossible to show by other testimony.
...Such declarations are regarded as verbal acts, and are compe-

tent as any other testimony when relevant to the issues. Their
truth or falsity is an inquiry for the Jury.lll

This is an exception limited to words which show an intent
to. do an act in the future, but if these same words recite an act
100 Rule 803 (3), Revised Draft at 105, 51 F.R.D. 419.
107 Comment, Revised Draft at 110, 51 F.R.D. 424.

108 Id.
109 When dealing with the Hearsay Rule, the words quoted above are
not flippancy on the part of the author.
110 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
111145 U.S. at 296, citing 'Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397, 404,
405 (1869).
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already accomplished they are excluded unless excepted by the
last phrase of the rule. Where is the logic in such a restriction
when the sub-exception has no logic behind it at all ?112
Treatises & Textbooks
At this time only three jurisdictions allow the use of learned
treatises as substantive evidence after varying requirements of
authenticity are met. 113 In Massachusetts, so many procedural
safeguards have been written into the rule, that it is virtually
unworkable." 4 In Illinois, as in a majority of the states, texts
again
may be used for cross-examination of expert witnesses,
115
after varying requirements of authenticity are met.
Proposed Rule 803 (18) provides:
(18) Learned Treatises. To the extent called to the attention
of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him
in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises,
periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other
science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony
or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by
may be read into evijudicial notice. If admitted, the statements
6
dence but may not be received as exhibits.
This language appears to follow the best and fairest rule, permitting the use of treatises on cross-examination, but not as
substantive evidence unless adopted by the witness. This rule
will surely enlarge an already burgeoning practice of using
treatises to cross-examine expert witnesses, but leaves to the
discretion of the trial judge how the cross-examination is handled. It will be that judge who will decide contextual disputes
and how much of the treatise may be read in rebuttal.
Judgment of Previous Conviction
From the common law many ancient practices still remain.
Once a felon was declared incompetent to testify. Now in most
jurisdictions, including Illinois, a rule allowing a conviction of
a felony or infamous crime to be introduced as impeachment is
in force." 7 The proposed federal rule is as follows:
(22) Judgment of Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final
judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not
upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a
112 Comment, Revised Draft at 110, 51 F.R.D. 424.
113 Alabama, Massachusetts, Nevada. For an illuminating discussion
of this area see D. LOuISELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE, 326
(1968).
114 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, §79(c) (1959).
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
115 Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hospital, 33 Il.
253 (1965).
116 Revised Draft at 107, 51 F.R.D. 421.
11ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §1 (1971).

See also Mulroy v. Prudential

Ins. Co., 299 Ill. App. 598, 20 N.E.2d 613 (1939).
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crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year,
to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for
purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other
than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but
does not affect admissibility." 8

The reader should note there is no limitation upon the age of the
conviction, an infamous crime is not necessary, as required in
Illinois, and the pendency of an appeal affects only the weight
of the evidence. All these points make the rule more liberal
in favor of admission than Illinois, with the exception of the
appeal point. 119
Business Records Exceptions
An initial reading of all the exceptions leaves one wondering: Where is the business record exception - the old shopbook

rule? You can find nothing labelled as such, but instead, the
drafters present these proposed exceptions:
(6)
Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time
by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
all in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(7) Absence of Entry in Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda,
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, of a regularly
conducted activity, to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of
the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 20

Notice that the word "business" does not appear in either of
these exceptions.1

2

Rule 803 (22), Revised Draft at 108, 51 F.R.D. 422.
119 People v. Henneman, 323 Ill. App. 124, 54 N.E.2d 745 (1944), twentyone year old conviction too remote; People v. Trent, 85 Ill. App. 2d 157, 228
N.E.2d 535 (1967), crime must be infamous; People v. Gardiner, 303 Ill.
204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922), must be a conviction, not misconduct; People v.
Barney, 89 Ill. App. 2d 180, 232 N.E.2d 481 (1967). the fact that an appeal
is pending makes no difference.
120 Rule 803(6) and (7), Revised Draft at 106, 51 F.R.D. 420.
121 Business or professional records can also be admitted through Exception (5) Recorded Recollections. Other excepted records by exception
number, within Rule 803 are (8) Public Records & Reports, (10) Absence
of Records & Reports, (9) Records of Vital Status, (11) Records of Religious
Organizations, (12) Marriage, Baptismal & Similar Certificates, (13) Family
Records, (14) Records of Documents Affecting an Interest in Property, (15)
Statements in Documents Affecting an Interest in Property, (16) Statements
in Ancient Documents, and (17) Market Reports, Commercial Publications.
Revised Draft at 105-08, 51 F.R.D. 419-22.
118
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Exception (7) is a codified exception for a negative search
for records, which warrants an inference of the nonoccurrence
or nonexistence of the matter. This reminds one of one of
McCormick's more interesting cases posed in his casebook on
evidence. A supplied of corn had his bulk shipment cut into
three parts and delivered to three separate customers, but only
one customer complained about the quality. The supplier attempted to admit evidence of the lack of complaints from the
other two, but his offer was denied. 1 2" Would this now be admitted? Would a manufacturer's bare complaint file concerning
a product which is the subject of a products liability action be
admitted? The answer to both questions is "yes," if relevant. 12 3
The drafters comment to exception (6) would seem to indicate the following items of evidence are admissible under this
exception:
1. All business and professional records;
2. All hospital records;
3. All doctors records and evaluation reports;
4. Accident reports.-2
Their admissibility is subject to the last phrase, "unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness." Allowing in all business records should pose
no problem as the federal courts have allowed such evidence for
many years. 2 5 The same is true for Illinois.126
Hospital records have been admissible in the federal
courts,'12 7 but prohibited in most courts of Illinois unless the
entries are separately admissible as admissions, declarations
against interest, spontaneous utterances, refreshing of recollection or past recollection recorded. 182" Physicians' records of care,
including in certain instances the history, have been admissible
in both jurisdictions, 129 but medical reports and evaluations have
30
not been allowed.
122 McMillen Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (1966).
123 See Rule 403, Revised Draft at 31, 51 F.R.D. 345.
124 Revised Draft at 113-15, 51 F.R.D. 427-29.
12"28 U.S.C. §1732(a); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Stojanowski, 191 F.
720 (1911); Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820).
126 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §3 (1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §236
(1971).
1'7 Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Soileau, 265 F.2d 90 (1959) ; Brown v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 F.2d 159 (1932); Wojciechowski v. States Marine
Corp. of Del., 155 F. Supp. 874 (1957).
128 Branch v. Wolfe, 300 Ill. App. 472, 21 N.E.2d 148 (1939) ; cf. Banks
v. Bauman Dairy Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 113, 212 N.E.2d 4 (1965).
129 Shell Oil Co. v. Indus. Comm., 2 Ill. 2d 590, 119 N.E.2d 224 (1954);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bullock, 59 F.2d 747 (1932).
10 Oard v. Dolan, 320 Ill. 371, 151 N.E. 244 (1926).
However, in
Melford v. Gaus and Brown Const. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 497, 151 N.E.2d 128
(1958), an electroencephalograph test was admitted. In the federal courts
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Is there anything untrustworthy per se about a medical
report and evaluation upon a personal injury claimant? Under
the eyes of the law, one would assume not.13 1 Then how does
an attorney practicing in the federal district court go about
keeping out a medical report and evaluation about a personal
injury claimant, written by a doctor who does not appear at trial
and who he has never had a chance to cross-examine? It would
be a better idea to re-write the rule excluding such evidence.
Finally, will a police accident report now be admissible as an
exhibit which the jurors may examine? It never has been before
in Illinois 132 or in this federal district.
CONCLUSION
To fully explain such a voluminous and complicated set of
evidentiary rules within a few pages is impossible. However,
it is hoped that this brief exploration has made the reader more
aware of what will probably stem from this ambitious attempt
into codification.
First, it seems fairly clear that either this set of proposed
rules or a very similar set will be adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States and its Congress. This means that all
Federal Court practitioners who try cases, or in fact, participate
in almost any area of federal litigation, will be faced with the
Federal Rules of Evidence to the exclusion of all other evidentiary rules.
Second, it is obvious that the proposed Federal Rules have
been prepared with painstaking labor and scholarship. However, like any pronouncement of a governmental body under our
system, the drafting and the enactment are only the beginnings.
Each rule will have to be interpreted and reinterpreted not only
at the level of the district courts, but throughout the federal
appellate system, including the Supreme Court of the United
States. It would be desirable for the district courts to study
the rules and consider the guidelines laid down in the Comments
before rendering evidentiary rulings. It would be of further
help if on novel issues these rulings would be in the form of
memorandum opinions, so that all could have the benefit of the
court's thinking.
such evidence is allowed. United States v. Timmons, 68 F.2d 654 (1934);
Long v. United States, 59 F.2d 602 (1932).
131 Although a federal narcotics agent's records of purchases have been

excluded as not sufficiently routine.
(7th Cir. 1957).

United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698

132 People v. Turner, 29 Ill. 2d 379, 194 N.E.2d 349 (1963) ; Paliokaitis
v. Checker Taxi Co., 324 Ill. App. 21, 57 N.E.2d 216 (1944).
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Finally, it seems clear that the Illinois practitioner will have
a laboratory close at hand in which he may study the operation
and effects of an evidence code. It may be that it is unworkable,
because we have too long adhered to now meaningless evidentiary
rules laid down in times past and followed only by rote. It is
also possible that the courts themselves may so cloud the rules
with totally diverse interpretations, that they fall of their own
weight. But it is more likely that with proper judicial handling,
and modest change, the rules will be a force which will endure
for years and stand as an example for most state legislatures to
adopt to improve their own system of justice.

